It's a pleasure to join you all this fine morning for yet again we're blessed with another opportunity to serve our Creator and live life with a purpose. I must say that this isn't a lecture, nor a one-way communication. I'm tasked to discuss about the plight of the IDPs.The IDPs like everyone of us are people and they deserve a fair chance in life to live with dignity and respect. The 2.2 million IDPs could've been anyone of us. It's likely that everyone in this group know someone who's an IDP. It's possible that we have first hand experience with the IDPs. Thus, it's paramount that the solutions of their plight come from us. It's commendable that everyone is chipping in from home and abroad to help proffer solutions but solutions must come from us. Therefore, I'll save us time from discussions about the problems - we all know what they are. Is it hunger? Is it jobless? Is it economic? Is it homelessness? Is it the mass orphans that we have or the widows we have roaming the streets? Is it lack of schools and access to healthcare? We all know what the problems are. Therefore, in my humble opinion, the solutions are not only financial and governance. The solutions lie within each and everyone of us. We must change we must GET INVOLVED and start asking the right questions of our leaders. What are they doing to make sure IDPs gain skills needed to work when they go back? What are we doing to make sure we help the IDPs who are our neighbours?There are many ways to kill a rat just like their are many ways to solve our problems. To allow us time to reflect and think through this discussion, I'll discuss one solution to the plight of IDPs. If I were given the audience to sit with President Buhari, this is what I'll tell him: Your Excellency, I urge you to reject international aid in the form of MOUs and written numbers on paper and cash transfers. Your Excellency, I urge you to tell all who committed to help rebuild northeast that they're welcome to come in with their plans to build hospitals, mass housing, schools and roads and modern agriculture machines and technology and computer. Bring their reputable staff and plans and use the money they want to donate to build directly for us. We have the human capital but lack the vision and foresight so the money will end up in individual pockets. Let's do the Chinese style but hire locally. I want the Caterpillars of America and the Berger of Germany to work side by side with the unemployed youth ready to work and learn. Let's put what's on paper in physical form. Enough with the committees and the discussions. Enough with talking, it's time to build schools and hospitals not as plans but in structures .We can't deny the fact that we lack sustainable solutions. Some of the federal roads we enjoy today are the same roads the colonial masters built. Who are we deceiving? We don't have the will power necessary to fight our Nafs from taking what's not ours. Therefore, e want a mass housing unit in Maiduguri like those built by habitat for humanity. We want community Heath centres built like those built in North Carolina after Katrina. We lack the vision but have the manpower. Mr President doesn't steal but the same can't be said about the people around him. The 2.2 million people don't care about politics and committees, they want to eat and go to school. We have individual and collective responsibilities as people. Are we doing enough to educate ourselves about our rights and responsibilities in society? We complain about our leaders but who elevated then to that ranking? Who voted them in? Are we sure we're educated enough about our leaders? Why are they still leading us when we know they're syphoning public funds? Why are we too afraid to speak up? Are us the media so afraid to protect the masses?Can we individually say we're doing enough to help IDPs? How many of us have changed our material consumption to accommodate and help IDPs in our neighbourhood? Yes, we all have our responsibilities to ourselves and our immediate family. But how have we changed our behaviour to help our neighbours? My income may not have increased but I can decrease my intake. Can I help feed the IDPs next door if I limit my household consumption of meats and eggs and substitute it with beans and fish instead? Perhaps. Every little count s.In the end, I urge everyone to reflect on the story of the bee from the Quran. I live by this story. I was told about the story when I was getting married and I reflect on it often. Allah SWT, in His infinite mercy uses story to teach us lessons but often times we hold on to the frivolous elements and neglect the gems.
The bee only pollinates the pure and fragrant flower and leaves behind honey. The bee does not pollinate where another bee has been, it looks elsewhere, subhanAllah. The bee works tirelessly and Allah rewards it with honey. Honey is used as a medicine and in a thousand other things.
Lesson: how do we expect to make honey when we pollinated in filth?To recap, my solution to the plight of IDPs is to reject foreign aid and ask for the foreigners to come in physically and work with us to rebuild northeast. We ask them to bring in their vision, their technology, their capacity, their experience, and their devotion and commitment to come in and work with us, the locals in the community to lay down one brick at a time and build schools and housings and roads and hospitals . let them come in with education materials in the container and teachers to teach us and engineers to work with our engineers, those who'd gone to school and those inherently talented and gifted ones who didn't go to school. let them keep their dollars and pound sterling and euros and buy materials and pay their staff while they work with us and pay us our naira but let us learn from them. let us work with them. let us learn from them . foreign aid is aiding corruption and keeping us stagnant .so many people are getting rich out of our misfortune. I still remember in the early days of Boko Haram how many Nigerians claim how it's just an issue affecting one side of nigeria, yet today, everyone from the south is setting up NGO and hiring our northern locals to work on their NGOs while they collect commitments from foreign agencies .we lack structure and we lack vision. it's nothing to be ashamed of. we've been brutally beaten in this fight. we've been beaten by each other and our leaders, we've been deceived, bamboozled, and shamed. what we have right know does not work any more. it's a laudable task to have the committee of elders once again proferring solutions to our problems, but our problems need 21st century solutions. we need fresh ideas but most importantly selfless people. We need people living a purpose driven life to answer to their calling not to their political party of godfather. If at all someone want to help us rebuild, we need to say no to accepting cash and ask for them to come in physically and get the work done. we need doers, thinkers, strategist, no matter who they are and they're from, we need them to believe in humanity. we must find sustainable solutions to help 2.2 million IDPs live life with respect and dignity.Thank you all for your time. I hope this conversation bring about lasting solution. Thanks Abdulaziz for your patience. Jamila kabiru Fagge
Saturday, January 7, 2017
Friday, January 6, 2017
Students life in campus and academic activities in the north eastern universities.
Campus life is suppose to be positively memorable and enjoyed by all students, but that is not always the case, as some pass through terrible experience before graduation. Majority of these students, are suppose to be in secondary schools as in olden days, are now spread across tertiary institutions,as premature struggling with childish behaviour,and nothing much is being done to help them. They are left to their fate to bear the cross. In my capacity as one saddled with the responsibilities to the students, Some problems they are facing are as follows :1- Poor study skills which lead to poor academic performance.
2-Poor career guidance which is misleading career choice through fantasy.
3-Negative attitude of some lecturers toward students which reinforces academic misconduct eg exam -malpractice.
4-Lack of required infrastructure and facilities in institutions, Faculties and Departments to enhance better academic attainment. 5-Cultism and drugs phenomenon.
6-Poor understanding of academic freedom by students.
7-Poverty and parental upbringing.
8-Societal decay as model to students.
9-Lack of management concern for students welfares causing hardship to students.
10-Lack of students interest for studies and negative impact of globalisation and technology, couple with lack of interest in education by all tiers of governments and parents are responsible for these problems.
11-Cultural and religious differences hindering normal socialisation among students which negate tolerance, love, friendship and peaceful co=existence. Correcting these predicaments will pave way for better, and make campus life more interesting thereby developing intellectuals and technocrats students and leaders that can develop the society. These are just a few of the problems. I believe discussions on them and many more will serve as catalyst in bringing sanity and a vibrant academic environment.
I sincerely appreciate the opportunity given to share my little knowledge with others
Long life the Northeast
Long life the Federal Republic of Nigeria . Prof S.Kunya
2-Poor career guidance which is misleading career choice through fantasy.
3-Negative attitude of some lecturers toward students which reinforces academic misconduct eg exam -malpractice.
4-Lack of required infrastructure and facilities in institutions, Faculties and Departments to enhance better academic attainment. 5-Cultism and drugs phenomenon.
6-Poor understanding of academic freedom by students.
7-Poverty and parental upbringing.
8-Societal decay as model to students.
9-Lack of management concern for students welfares causing hardship to students.
10-Lack of students interest for studies and negative impact of globalisation and technology, couple with lack of interest in education by all tiers of governments and parents are responsible for these problems.
11-Cultural and religious differences hindering normal socialisation among students which negate tolerance, love, friendship and peaceful co=existence. Correcting these predicaments will pave way for better, and make campus life more interesting thereby developing intellectuals and technocrats students and leaders that can develop the society. These are just a few of the problems. I believe discussions on them and many more will serve as catalyst in bringing sanity and a vibrant academic environment.
I sincerely appreciate the opportunity given to share my little knowledge with others
Long life the Northeast
Long life the Federal Republic of Nigeria . Prof S.Kunya
Monday, October 10, 2016
BASICS GUIDE TO FAVOUR OR NOT FAVOUR DSS ARREST OF JUDGES
For the attention of those criticising the action of the DSS!
BASIC GUIDE TO ARGUING EITHER IN FAVOUR OR AGAINST THE RECENT ARRESTS OF SOME JUDICIAL OFFICERS BY THE DSS.
Before you argue either in favour of the recent arrests of some judicial officers by the DSS, it is important that most of you know the following facts. They will guide you to argue intelligently and intelligibly. This is my part of contribution to the change agenda.
1. No judicial officer has immunity against, arrest, search, investigation and/or prosecution in respect of an allegation of crime.
2. The National Judicial Commission (NJC) is responsible for the appointment, discipline/punishment of judicial officers only in respect of breach of judicial ethics, and not crime.
3. Even where a judicial officer has been sanctioned by the NJC for any misconduct, the state still reserves the right to prosecute the erring officer if his misconduct amounts to a crime.
4. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015) is the procedural law that guides the activities of all federal investigating and prosecutorial agencies like the police, EFCC, ICPC, DSSS,etc., as well as the Federal High Court, High Court of the FCT, National Industrial Court, Code of Conduct Tribunal, etc.
5. Any action taken by any prosecutorial agency either during investigation or prosecution must be in line with the ACJA
4. Under the ACJA, there is no time limit or time frame when a person can be arrested. There is no day that a person cannot be arrested.
5. Sections 12 (2) & 13 ACJA give a law officer the power to break into and out of any house for the purpose of arresting a suspect who fails to let the arresting officer in.
6. Section 43 (1) ACJA states: "A warrant of arrest may be executed on any day, including a Sunday or public holiday."
7. The person arresting may not necessarily be the person to prosecute. A private person may arrest a suspect and hand him over to a prosecuting authority(Section 23 ACJA).
8. A person may be arrested notwithstanding that the person arresting him is not in possession of an arrest warrant on demand, but can show the warrant as soon as practicable. Section 44 ACJA.
9. "A warrant of arrest issued by a Federal High Court sitting anywhere may be executed in any part of Nigeria." Section 47 (1) ACJA.
10. A search warrant can be executed by anyone to whom it is directed (Section 147 ACJA).
11. "A search warrant may be issued and executed at any time on any day, including a Sunday or public holiday."(Section 148).
12. Apart from the President, vice president, Governor and a Deputy Governor, no other person has immunity from arrest and/or prosecution
BASIC GUIDE TO ARGUING EITHER IN FAVOUR OR AGAINST THE RECENT ARRESTS OF SOME JUDICIAL OFFICERS BY THE DSS.
Before you argue either in favour of the recent arrests of some judicial officers by the DSS, it is important that most of you know the following facts. They will guide you to argue intelligently and intelligibly. This is my part of contribution to the change agenda.
1. No judicial officer has immunity against, arrest, search, investigation and/or prosecution in respect of an allegation of crime.
2. The National Judicial Commission (NJC) is responsible for the appointment, discipline/punishment of judicial officers only in respect of breach of judicial ethics, and not crime.
3. Even where a judicial officer has been sanctioned by the NJC for any misconduct, the state still reserves the right to prosecute the erring officer if his misconduct amounts to a crime.
4. The Administration of Criminal Justice Act (2015) is the procedural law that guides the activities of all federal investigating and prosecutorial agencies like the police, EFCC, ICPC, DSSS,etc., as well as the Federal High Court, High Court of the FCT, National Industrial Court, Code of Conduct Tribunal, etc.
5. Any action taken by any prosecutorial agency either during investigation or prosecution must be in line with the ACJA
4. Under the ACJA, there is no time limit or time frame when a person can be arrested. There is no day that a person cannot be arrested.
5. Sections 12 (2) & 13 ACJA give a law officer the power to break into and out of any house for the purpose of arresting a suspect who fails to let the arresting officer in.
6. Section 43 (1) ACJA states: "A warrant of arrest may be executed on any day, including a Sunday or public holiday."
7. The person arresting may not necessarily be the person to prosecute. A private person may arrest a suspect and hand him over to a prosecuting authority(Section 23 ACJA).
8. A person may be arrested notwithstanding that the person arresting him is not in possession of an arrest warrant on demand, but can show the warrant as soon as practicable. Section 44 ACJA.
9. "A warrant of arrest issued by a Federal High Court sitting anywhere may be executed in any part of Nigeria." Section 47 (1) ACJA.
10. A search warrant can be executed by anyone to whom it is directed (Section 147 ACJA).
11. "A search warrant may be issued and executed at any time on any day, including a Sunday or public holiday."(Section 148).
12. Apart from the President, vice president, Governor and a Deputy Governor, no other person has immunity from arrest and/or prosecution
Wednesday, October 5, 2016
NIGERIAN LOOTERS
The Nigerian looters have long resolved to take care of themselves-no matter their region and religion. they don't have tribal marks but are one family. Injury to one of them is injury to all. But deluded Nigerians on social media continue to classify Nigeria along ethno-religious Lines. As soon as Hon Abdulmumin Jubril broke ranks with his partners in-crime in the House of representatives and Began to sing,i knew he would be the one to bite the dust. I just knew it. It's budget padding allegations should Naturally provide an opportunity To cleanse the Legislature. Instead Jibrin has been suspended and the beat goes on..Nigeria!!!🤔
Sunday, September 25, 2016
DEMINISING NORTH-EAST
Government should establish a comprehensive Explosive Detection and Disarming Program in Northeast Nigeria ...
As residents of liberated areas begin to leave IDP camps for what use to be their homes, villages and communities, they face a serious threat from unexploded bombs (UXBs), Improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), and conventional munitions deployed by both parties in the conflict.
Use of IEDs and non Military grade explosives is not new to Nigeria during the civil war, Biafran fighters deployed IEDs as a tactical weapon to compliment its lack of arms and to slow the advance of federal troops, they deployed these unconventional crude crafted explosives in anti personnel and anti vehicle roles during the war. The first recorded use of VBIED was in July 1967, when a car filled with explosives attempted to enter the Police HQ in Lagos.
Insurgents in North east Nigeria are the first group to extensively deploy IEDs and VBIEDs to deliberately target civilians and troops, The group began using small IEDs in 2011 to attack security forces and soft targets, They used their first VBIED to attack the UN compound in Abuja, further more IEDs have been used to interdict and arm bush military convoys and patrols teams in North East Nigeria, Due to present success in the Government counter terrorism and counter insurgency CTCOIN operations indigenes of rural communities living in IDP camps around Northern Nigeria are beginning to leave this camps for what used to be their homes , The Government has also launched rebuilding programs expected to work towards exploring the agricultural , solid mineral and crude oil potential of the North eastern part of Nigeria, This unexploded ordinance, IEDs and VBIEDs post a threat to this crucial rebuilding programs, safety of returning civilians, workers and wild life.
Nigeria Army EOD units are currently clearing mines and IEDs placed in different locations but they face the challenge of a massive landscape and rugged topography which makes it difficult to completely clear the region of IEDs, VBIEDs and unexploded ordinances ,The remoteness of certain locations also means that there will always be areas Troops cannot deploy anti mining vehicles or EOD personnel’s , These has made It very important for the government to established a civilian base IEDD (Improvised Explosive Device Disposal) teams as well as the disposal of conventional munitions made of members of the civilian JTF(local vigilantes) , Due to their knowledge of local terrain, they are able to notice disturbance to the ground where explosives have been buried and will play crucial role in government explosive detection and Demining activities, their regular presence in the villages and towns makes it easy for them to respond to emergency situations concerning conventional explosives , Mines, IED,BOMB threats, With necessary training and equipments, assets like bomb detecting dogs, they can detect this explosive or intervene in situations where innocent civilians returning to their farms or villages step on IED or Mine , Thus engaging CJTF is a key counter IED task.
Government needs to also provide necessary technical knowledge using police EOD experts to train and retrain CJTF members drafted into the IEDD teams, necessary survival equipments, kits and capabilities to should be provided to teams, further more Government should put the teams under direct leadership and supervision of the Nigeria police force, to ensure standard and discipline, International Demining Organization should be invited to assist in the clearance. Government will only be able to clean up the North eastern region of Nigeria faster using locals / CJTF personnel’s, During complicated situation for CJTF Demining personnel’s, they are expected to call for assistance from the nearest military facilities or police Bomb disposal unit . The North east today has military grade and crude crafted explosives scattered around, it is a matter of national concern and importance to clean up the region to enable full exploration of its enormous environmental resources by both the government, private firms and returning populace.
As residents of liberated areas begin to leave IDP camps for what use to be their homes, villages and communities, they face a serious threat from unexploded bombs (UXBs), Improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), and conventional munitions deployed by both parties in the conflict.
Use of IEDs and non Military grade explosives is not new to Nigeria during the civil war, Biafran fighters deployed IEDs as a tactical weapon to compliment its lack of arms and to slow the advance of federal troops, they deployed these unconventional crude crafted explosives in anti personnel and anti vehicle roles during the war. The first recorded use of VBIED was in July 1967, when a car filled with explosives attempted to enter the Police HQ in Lagos.
Insurgents in North east Nigeria are the first group to extensively deploy IEDs and VBIEDs to deliberately target civilians and troops, The group began using small IEDs in 2011 to attack security forces and soft targets, They used their first VBIED to attack the UN compound in Abuja, further more IEDs have been used to interdict and arm bush military convoys and patrols teams in North East Nigeria, Due to present success in the Government counter terrorism and counter insurgency CTCOIN operations indigenes of rural communities living in IDP camps around Northern Nigeria are beginning to leave this camps for what used to be their homes , The Government has also launched rebuilding programs expected to work towards exploring the agricultural , solid mineral and crude oil potential of the North eastern part of Nigeria, This unexploded ordinance, IEDs and VBIEDs post a threat to this crucial rebuilding programs, safety of returning civilians, workers and wild life.
Nigeria Army EOD units are currently clearing mines and IEDs placed in different locations but they face the challenge of a massive landscape and rugged topography which makes it difficult to completely clear the region of IEDs, VBIEDs and unexploded ordinances ,The remoteness of certain locations also means that there will always be areas Troops cannot deploy anti mining vehicles or EOD personnel’s , These has made It very important for the government to established a civilian base IEDD (Improvised Explosive Device Disposal) teams as well as the disposal of conventional munitions made of members of the civilian JTF(local vigilantes) , Due to their knowledge of local terrain, they are able to notice disturbance to the ground where explosives have been buried and will play crucial role in government explosive detection and Demining activities, their regular presence in the villages and towns makes it easy for them to respond to emergency situations concerning conventional explosives , Mines, IED,BOMB threats, With necessary training and equipments, assets like bomb detecting dogs, they can detect this explosive or intervene in situations where innocent civilians returning to their farms or villages step on IED or Mine , Thus engaging CJTF is a key counter IED task.
Government needs to also provide necessary technical knowledge using police EOD experts to train and retrain CJTF members drafted into the IEDD teams, necessary survival equipments, kits and capabilities to should be provided to teams, further more Government should put the teams under direct leadership and supervision of the Nigeria police force, to ensure standard and discipline, International Demining Organization should be invited to assist in the clearance. Government will only be able to clean up the North eastern region of Nigeria faster using locals / CJTF personnel’s, During complicated situation for CJTF Demining personnel’s, they are expected to call for assistance from the nearest military facilities or police Bomb disposal unit . The North east today has military grade and crude crafted explosives scattered around, it is a matter of national concern and importance to clean up the region to enable full exploration of its enormous environmental resources by both the government, private firms and returning populace.
Friday, September 23, 2016
SELLING OF ASSETS? NO
Sale of National Assets: NO by khalifa dikwa. It is a distraction from equally serious corruption issues and an attempt to walk Nigerians into slavery, it is a deliberate card by the double agents to further run Nigeria's economy aground when the FG has the option of a time framed concession / mortgaging of a few less strategic assets to shore up our foreign reserves or outrightly borrow from a few international development banks that will not impose throat cutting interests or other conditions. There are friendly nations that can lend Nigeria more than $15b needed to pull Nigeria out of its cumulative recession. A few of them can raise the said amount as loans or loots when properly grilled by EFCC and cooperation of similar national and international agencies. This amount can easily be retrieved from looters if we have a corrective legislative bureaucracy devoid of judicial gymnastics supporting EFCC and DSS, now that the entire world trusts Buhari govt for blocking holes hitherto institutionalised by a few folks to steal and share our commonwealth. If these folks are allowed another chance, they will repeat what they did in the past. They may sell even the Presidency, the National Assembly, military barracks, etc as they did with the National quarters built for our legislators, NITEL, NEPA etc. The 2011 report on similar sales may boil the blood of the healthiest Nigerians. Let the proponents of the sale start selling their personal belongings, give the proceeds to Nigeria as gift or loans rather than asking FG to again sell our inherited national strategic assets meant for us and our children. Any govt that does so will surrender its authority and guts to a few capitalists who cannot even show their tax certificates or have their fronting cronies in the 3 arms of govt to declare their assets.. Nigeria must not gamble with its authority to check excesses of national saboteurs. It is simply weird and shameless on their part to even think of it. Perhaps, they were the ones who fronted for the previous actors behind our present mess. Prof.Khalifa Dikwa
Saturday, July 23, 2016
ETIMOLOGY OF BOKO HARAM -ABDULHAMID AL-GAZALI
Understanding Some Fundamental Issues On Boko Haram
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
Abdulhamid Al-Gazali, algazali04@yahoo.com
Preface
Let me this week start my column unusually with a short preface that goes thus:
This piece, as a continuation of the lecture I delivered to Hilal Islamic Crescent on the 11th of Ramadan, 1435 A.H., is second part of the series I'm inspired by the said lecture to write in the few coming weeks. Since they are written only within the period of a week each, readers should bear with the fact that as much as I will like to, I cannot deal with the many vexing topics in that area exhaustibly. However, I hope to at the end, upgrade each and adjust them into a book for publication as part of my input to the ongoing studies/debates in that area of knowledge (Boko Haram) as a historian and someone who actually saw it from its onset for the purpose of history, security and studies. This, and the first part should therefore be treated by the reader as (a disjointed) preliminary.
BOKO HARAM: ETYMOLOGY
When I wrote last time on this subject, I did not take the time to make some very fundamental clarification on some key issues. I think for a better understanding of the crisis, I should, now.
No meaningful study of this crisis will be thorough without concentrating it even if in passing to the 'etymology' of the term 'Boko Haram' (Western education is prohibited) as it refers to the insurgents--especially at a preliminary stage. Many have treated this term as though it was the insurgents that chose to refer to themselves as so. Indeed, they were not, but certainly, whoever it was, you wonder what term could have been fitter! Their overall body language, their dispositions, the crux of their arguments, and sometimes--perhaps sometimes--their actions even at their early stages reflects the fittingness of this term to them.
Of course there couldn't have been a better name for a group of people who declared Western education a major sin and promise to stop it! There's no doubt about the fact that Muhammad Yusuf had unequivocally confirmed--to those who sought to understand whether he was only against some aspect of the Western education or the whole of it and/or confusing it with Western culture--that everything about it is 'haram' (prohibited).
So to start to rationalise this will amount to bozoism. Of course some have attempted doing that especially when he said after his capture that computers and other technologies are but not 'haram'. But this only goes to show that Yusuf did not understand what he was fighting. What is science, without technology, you tend to ask. Of course, this man had never been to any Western school to understand anything about it.
At a stage we thought he was against Western concepts, values and ideas such as feminism, democracy, liberalism, communism and so on. But to be honest with you, even though to Muslims, they are un-Islamic, Muhammed Yusuf did not understand what they stood for and/or meant, to afford him that excuse.
Or, what do you think of one who thinks Boko is all about Darwinist theory of evolution? Who thinks 'planet' is the same thing as the'world'? So, to be honest with you, this man is just a puritanical literalist with very shallow understanding of other necessary basic Islamic texts that complement the understanding of the message of the Quran. They are in Islam referred to as 'khawarij'--those who went out (of Islam), though unbeknownst to them--because of their puritan literalism and exceedingly extreme interpretation of, yes, sensitive texts. This however is common to virtually all religions. In fact, the person to whom Muhammad Yusuf can be compared is not Osama bin Laden, but John Kony of the Lord's Resistance Army, whose puritan interpretation of the Biblical text led him to believe that the world must be governed--and he will see to its implementation--by the 10 Commandments of the Bible even if thousands would die in the course.
This is a digression from the central theme of the piece, but the reason why I deem it necessary is because I want to show that though the sect members did not call themselves 'Boko Haram', their body language and utterances--ie their preaching and sermons--have already 'allocated' it to them.
Within Maiduguri, we used to refer to them as Yusufiyya: those who follow Yusuf's warped interpretation of the Quran. Though it has to be noted--again--that at the early stages of this movement, most people embraced it believing that it was the true teachings of Islam.
While we used to call them Yusufiyya, they referred to themselves as Jamma'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ). However, when they declared a war against the state, the term 'Boko Haram'--when it was coined by an Aljazeera reporter--became popular. That was in June 2009.
It was used even before that time to refer to them by few. The term was in fact taken from the commentaries of his followers. Those who Muhammad Yusuf had convinced, went an extra mile in some very hyper critical ways to conclude that Boko--even when Muhammad was reluctant to disclose--haram. It was common to hear from their seemingly proselytising commentaries that Boko is haram, downright; that working with the government is un-Islamic; that the government does not worth the loyalty of the people. I have known many people who, convinced to the brim, authoritatively tell people--and it was us--that Boko and working with the government is haram and they pitied them--and it was us--for not understanding that. People hearing these things a little more frequently, therefore began to ascribe the term 'Boko Haram' to them. But it is not the group's official name. 'Boko Haram' cannot be a sect's name as it means 'western education is forbidden'.
So the point here is, the fact that we have continued to call them Boko Haram has confused and misled us to believe that the group was particularly aimed at stopping or attacking western education. This is not entirely true as some of their actions and targets seem to suggest. When we come to treat #Targets of Boko Haram, this point will be adequately elaborated. But for now, this should noted.
PHASES OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY
Secondly, attention has to be drawn to the phases in the Boko Haram crisis as it has varying ones. As you may have already known, it used to have two phases, but three now-and went through many stages in its development. The first phase was before 2009. That was when they waged a war against the state, in a retaliation to the assault of the then security men under the aegis of Operation Flush on their men. The war was the closing of the first phase.
About a year after the war, the second phase of its development started, when the remaining few of the war forces, under Abubakar Shakau, regrouped--and drafted in new recruits--and began to unleash terror. That was when they evolved into a full-blown terrorist organisation.
The third phase is the post-Maiduguri phase. This phase started at the middle of 2013 when the Civilian JTF emerged and sent the insurgents completely out of Maiduguri. During this time, their (mode of) operations, centre of activity and targets changed. Typically, each of these three phases vary in mode of operation, severity, targets and what have you, such that, while the first phase was basically about preaching dangerous messages and posing threats, the second phase was about guerrilla warfare and the third about organised massacre and intensified kidnapping. And at the end, it can be seen that the story of Boko Haram is a story of the making of a terrorist group or perhaps the evolution of a terrorist organisation.
Now, it will be misleading to overlook or ignore these phases and/or treat them as one thing. Granted, they are three phases of one thing; but there are aspects of these phases that can best be understood only when they are treated in isolation. It is fair to say, the 2009 war marked a point of transition from the first to the second phase, and the emergence of CJTF in the middle of 2013, to the third phase; but it is even fairer to first treat the reasons for these series of transitions, before concentrating on the phases separately and drawing out their connections and dichotomies.
FACTORS THAT ACCOUNTED FOR THE TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND PHASE OF BOKO HARAM
The second phase saw the re-emergence of Boko Haram as a full-blown terrorist organisation that moved away from mere preaching to unleashing terror. Clandestine killings of selected targets, particularly those who at any time opposed them, soon claimed the lives of hundreds. These included many prominent clerics who used to oppose their ideologies and provide counterarguments; district heads who collaborated with the government to identify them and security forces particularly the police who killed many of their members including their leader extra-judicially. But let me highlight some of the reasons for this.
First, as I have already stated in the first part, there was a great mishandling of the situation by the government. The government failed to understand that the problem was a social one and deserves solution from the same line. We must continue to say that the deployment of the security forces under the auspices of Operation Flush was what aggravated an already dangerous situation. Throughout the world, the government of the day seem not have known, that the moment you invite the military to address a social problem (which you are partly or in whole responsible for), they would only help to compound the situation--and they were invited and have compounded it beyond redemption.
Yes, Muhammad Yusuf was preaching a very dangerous message--and people were getting increasingly convinced--about the injustices of the government, its brutality against Islam, telling them how much the government hates the kind of their organisations, and very clearly, the government helped to confirm his messages, to convince the followers even more. The government invited soldiers who soon as they arrived began to harass people such that even those who did not believe in his messages initially began to see reason in them. Soon, we began to hear in people's conversations, such things as: 'Allah Ya yi wa malam (Muhammad Yusuf) albarka, yau yayi kaca-kaca da sojoji' - 'may God bless malam, he has condemned the soldiers flat-out today'. People who never even knew him, the victims of the soldiers' brutality, sympathisers of these victims, were hearing these things. And just too naturally, they began to flock to his preaching, believing that they would find expression of their contempt in a fearless man!
What ought to have been done then was actually to engage the leadership of the potentially dangerous organisation in an endless dialogue. Yes keep dialoguing with them. Invite them together with other scholars to the government house, talk to them. Build schools and ensure that all potential members of the group go to schools. Engage the youths in some job. Encourage other scholars to enlighten the people on the correct teaching of Islam without causing rancour and confusion.
To the best of my knowledge, none of these was done. The military crackdown on not only members of the sect as a perceived solution only helped to generate contempt for the state and eventually succeeded in breeding 'vengeful violence' in the people of the state. I have known many, to be frank, who were happy, at least at the early days, when the insurgents declared a full-scale war against the military. The point here is not to say that these people were in support or sympathetic of the insurgents, but perhaps were fed up with the excesses of the military. So it goes on to show how the soldiers compounded the matter.
You can't flog an old man in his sixties just because he crossed a red-line or ask him to frog-jump and expect his children, relations and the people around to like you in a place like Maiduguri where elders are almost revered. You would, I swear, wonder whether we were in a military regime, because it had become common to come across such scenes all over Maiduguri all the time where people are flogged or punished one way or the other for no good reason.
May the soul of HRH, Alhaji Mustapha Umar El-Kanemi, the then Shehu of Borno, rest in peace. By far, he was the only person who understood the gravity of the situation, but at the same time understood the right solution it deserved. It can be recalled that in 2006 when the insurgents defied the Shehu's order to observe the eid on a certain day and went on to perform theirs a day or two earlier, the state government mobilised security men to stop them. Perhaps it was the same Shehu whose order was defied that intervened and warned the government on the use of force. The insurgents even as early as that time were armed to teeth, battle ready, as they went out to perform their eid. It was him who had always engaged the sect leader in dialogues, admonishing him to shun violence and extremism. But sadly he died along the way and the government did not think it worthy to carry on.
The second reason was the extra-judicial killing of some of the sect members particularly their leader--as if they are innocent of that themselves! The killing of the sect leader instantly on his capture by the police was one of the things that went a long way in clearing the way for the re-emergence of the sect as an entirely terrorist group. No doubt, at the end, he has to be killed, but it has to go through the legal framework.
This factor contributed in at least two or three ways. First, it was his killing alongside some of his men extra-judicially that developed in the remaining members the feelings of vengeance. Perhaps Yusuf in a certain session of his preaching had told his followers that he knew he would be killed for saying the truth, but it was left to them, to wake up and continue the task of 'Boko-haramising' education, of establishing Sharia and so on. And he said the 'truth'--and the lies--and got killed! Perhaps whatever he said, was a gospel! And with this, is anyone surprised with Shekau's ruthlessness?
Second, it was perhaps what paved the way for Shekau who is more ruthlessly violent and aggressive to emerge as the leader of the sect. We knew that it was Shekau who almost single-handedly pressed for the 2009 war to be declared. In fact, it was said that it was him who shot Muhammad Yusuf on his arms the night before the war to push for it. He threatened him that if he did not declare the war, he would be considered an apostate himself and thus be killed too! In a piece I penned in 2011, 'We All Miss Muhammad Yusuf', I have noted that, if he was not killed instantly on his capture, chances were that one: his men would not have regrouped to take revenge. Two, if however they do (which they did), it was easier to dialogue with them, since he must have to be in detention, or ask him to instruct them, since they were quite obedient to him, to ceasefire.
Third, of course, had he been dealt with according to the law, eventually, many hidden secrets capable of bringing the crisis to an end would have been unravelled. Had he been thoroughly interrogated by security forces, professional journalists and students of knowledge, possibly this crisis would have been over now. Unfortunately, this opportunity was missed, obviously, for reasons that some truth-phobic entities wanted him and what he knew dead!
That was injustice. That was why earlier in the first part of this piece, it was noted that this crisis is fundamentally a bi-product of injustice: a reaction to injustice in stages, the first, second and third phases being results of injustice at different degrees.
Furthermore, it could be said with all confidence that those who survived the war of 2009 were quite too few to really regroup and fight back. However, what happened was that while the few, most of whom were actually the most powerful members, regrouped, they recruited new members. Our focus at this juncture is therefore, since the recruitment was almost necessary for them, how they were able to do that. This question is valid insofar as a meaningful inference is hoped to be drawn at the end because it was clear that after the war it must have clear to all and sundry that the Boko Haram madness was up to no good; and with the defeat they suffered in just three days of fight, they would not succeed even in future, to contemplate joining.
Perhaps, among such factors was the extreme poverty and idleness that our youths found themselves in. A mention has to be made that majority of the Boko Haram forces who operate now joined it after the war and did not even ever meet Muhammad Yusuf or heard his preaching up to this point in time. In 2013, I have personally interviewed over three of the insurgents when they were captured by the Civilian JTF and they all confirmed this line of argument! Of course, it could be recalled that in the first part, it was noted that even before Muhammad Yusuf armed his followers with guns, there were youths who already had with them guns and other deadly weapons.
Such youths were initially in the payrolls of politicians, as we know, particularly Ali Sheriff. But after the 2007 election, these violent thugs began to lose the patronage and support they enjoyed initially from the politicians, because their principal employer in the person of Ali Sheriff then under the defunct platform of ANPP (APP earlier) had already been re-elected for the second and last time. A note ought to be made here that these violent youths played key role in the politics of Borno then in such outrageously nonsensical crimes as carting away with ballot boxes, intimidating opposition and election agents into fear, multiple voting and etc--which were what determined the outcome of elections in the state. He was therefore growing disinterested in them as he was not running for a third term. Perhaps this can be understood from the fact that as a result of falling out with them, at the tail-end of his regime, Ali Sheriff imposed a very restrictive curfew on 'achaba' (motorcycle) as a punishment to them. They fell out because Ali Sheriff could not keep on 'furnishing' them with money as he was not after a third term. This provoked them to the extent that they swore to massively vote against him when he vied for the post of a senator in the state's metropolis. When he eventually failed to a PDP aspirant, I think we are all living witnesses to the jubilation that greeted it.
Now, by 2011, these thugs did not only fall out with their boss, he in fact relocated to Abuja, therefore 'introducing' an end to the era of ECOMOGs (violent politics). But this he did without dispossessing them of the weapons he and his likes had armed them with. And no more enjoying the patronage of the government that emerged, which not only ignored them, but derided, they became both jobless and idle. Already armed, perfected on the art of terror, uneducated, jobless and idle, how are these youths NOT ready made recruits for a Boko Haram ready to rain down money?
These youths had already specialised on the art of violence and unleashing terror, which included clandestine killings, intimidating and harassing innocent people. With no iota of Muhammad Yusuf's ideology, talk less of inspiration from Islam, but every element of materialism, these youths were recruited by the re-emerging Boko Haram, operating on the dictates of Shekau. These was even easier since the mode of operation was guerilla in nature and thus, membership remain highly secret.
Let us also add that the banning of motorcycles on the streets of Maiduguri in 2011 by the emergent governor, Kashim Shettima, deprived many of sources of livelihood, thus compounding an already compounded situation!
I think enough is said about some of the factors that brought us to where we are now. But obviously, if the first part of the piece was concentrated to the factors that brought about the first phase of the insurgency, and this the second, I think the justice has to be extended to the third phase, which we are in now, starting from mid 2013.
To be continued...
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
Abdulhamid Al-Gazali, algazali04@yahoo.com
Preface
Let me this week start my column unusually with a short preface that goes thus:
This piece, as a continuation of the lecture I delivered to Hilal Islamic Crescent on the 11th of Ramadan, 1435 A.H., is second part of the series I'm inspired by the said lecture to write in the few coming weeks. Since they are written only within the period of a week each, readers should bear with the fact that as much as I will like to, I cannot deal with the many vexing topics in that area exhaustibly. However, I hope to at the end, upgrade each and adjust them into a book for publication as part of my input to the ongoing studies/debates in that area of knowledge (Boko Haram) as a historian and someone who actually saw it from its onset for the purpose of history, security and studies. This, and the first part should therefore be treated by the reader as (a disjointed) preliminary.
BOKO HARAM: ETYMOLOGY
When I wrote last time on this subject, I did not take the time to make some very fundamental clarification on some key issues. I think for a better understanding of the crisis, I should, now.
No meaningful study of this crisis will be thorough without concentrating it even if in passing to the 'etymology' of the term 'Boko Haram' (Western education is prohibited) as it refers to the insurgents--especially at a preliminary stage. Many have treated this term as though it was the insurgents that chose to refer to themselves as so. Indeed, they were not, but certainly, whoever it was, you wonder what term could have been fitter! Their overall body language, their dispositions, the crux of their arguments, and sometimes--perhaps sometimes--their actions even at their early stages reflects the fittingness of this term to them.
Of course there couldn't have been a better name for a group of people who declared Western education a major sin and promise to stop it! There's no doubt about the fact that Muhammad Yusuf had unequivocally confirmed--to those who sought to understand whether he was only against some aspect of the Western education or the whole of it and/or confusing it with Western culture--that everything about it is 'haram' (prohibited).
So to start to rationalise this will amount to bozoism. Of course some have attempted doing that especially when he said after his capture that computers and other technologies are but not 'haram'. But this only goes to show that Yusuf did not understand what he was fighting. What is science, without technology, you tend to ask. Of course, this man had never been to any Western school to understand anything about it.
At a stage we thought he was against Western concepts, values and ideas such as feminism, democracy, liberalism, communism and so on. But to be honest with you, even though to Muslims, they are un-Islamic, Muhammed Yusuf did not understand what they stood for and/or meant, to afford him that excuse.
Or, what do you think of one who thinks Boko is all about Darwinist theory of evolution? Who thinks 'planet' is the same thing as the'world'? So, to be honest with you, this man is just a puritanical literalist with very shallow understanding of other necessary basic Islamic texts that complement the understanding of the message of the Quran. They are in Islam referred to as 'khawarij'--those who went out (of Islam), though unbeknownst to them--because of their puritan literalism and exceedingly extreme interpretation of, yes, sensitive texts. This however is common to virtually all religions. In fact, the person to whom Muhammad Yusuf can be compared is not Osama bin Laden, but John Kony of the Lord's Resistance Army, whose puritan interpretation of the Biblical text led him to believe that the world must be governed--and he will see to its implementation--by the 10 Commandments of the Bible even if thousands would die in the course.
This is a digression from the central theme of the piece, but the reason why I deem it necessary is because I want to show that though the sect members did not call themselves 'Boko Haram', their body language and utterances--ie their preaching and sermons--have already 'allocated' it to them.
Within Maiduguri, we used to refer to them as Yusufiyya: those who follow Yusuf's warped interpretation of the Quran. Though it has to be noted--again--that at the early stages of this movement, most people embraced it believing that it was the true teachings of Islam.
While we used to call them Yusufiyya, they referred to themselves as Jamma'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ). However, when they declared a war against the state, the term 'Boko Haram'--when it was coined by an Aljazeera reporter--became popular. That was in June 2009.
It was used even before that time to refer to them by few. The term was in fact taken from the commentaries of his followers. Those who Muhammad Yusuf had convinced, went an extra mile in some very hyper critical ways to conclude that Boko--even when Muhammad was reluctant to disclose--haram. It was common to hear from their seemingly proselytising commentaries that Boko is haram, downright; that working with the government is un-Islamic; that the government does not worth the loyalty of the people. I have known many people who, convinced to the brim, authoritatively tell people--and it was us--that Boko and working with the government is haram and they pitied them--and it was us--for not understanding that. People hearing these things a little more frequently, therefore began to ascribe the term 'Boko Haram' to them. But it is not the group's official name. 'Boko Haram' cannot be a sect's name as it means 'western education is forbidden'.
So the point here is, the fact that we have continued to call them Boko Haram has confused and misled us to believe that the group was particularly aimed at stopping or attacking western education. This is not entirely true as some of their actions and targets seem to suggest. When we come to treat #Targets of Boko Haram, this point will be adequately elaborated. But for now, this should noted.
PHASES OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY
Secondly, attention has to be drawn to the phases in the Boko Haram crisis as it has varying ones. As you may have already known, it used to have two phases, but three now-and went through many stages in its development. The first phase was before 2009. That was when they waged a war against the state, in a retaliation to the assault of the then security men under the aegis of Operation Flush on their men. The war was the closing of the first phase.
About a year after the war, the second phase of its development started, when the remaining few of the war forces, under Abubakar Shakau, regrouped--and drafted in new recruits--and began to unleash terror. That was when they evolved into a full-blown terrorist organisation.
The third phase is the post-Maiduguri phase. This phase started at the middle of 2013 when the Civilian JTF emerged and sent the insurgents completely out of Maiduguri. During this time, their (mode of) operations, centre of activity and targets changed. Typically, each of these three phases vary in mode of operation, severity, targets and what have you, such that, while the first phase was basically about preaching dangerous messages and posing threats, the second phase was about guerrilla warfare and the third about organised massacre and intensified kidnapping. And at the end, it can be seen that the story of Boko Haram is a story of the making of a terrorist group or perhaps the evolution of a terrorist organisation.
Now, it will be misleading to overlook or ignore these phases and/or treat them as one thing. Granted, they are three phases of one thing; but there are aspects of these phases that can best be understood only when they are treated in isolation. It is fair to say, the 2009 war marked a point of transition from the first to the second phase, and the emergence of CJTF in the middle of 2013, to the third phase; but it is even fairer to first treat the reasons for these series of transitions, before concentrating on the phases separately and drawing out their connections and dichotomies.
FACTORS THAT ACCOUNTED FOR THE TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND PHASE OF BOKO HARAM
The second phase saw the re-emergence of Boko Haram as a full-blown terrorist organisation that moved away from mere preaching to unleashing terror. Clandestine killings of selected targets, particularly those who at any time opposed them, soon claimed the lives of hundreds. These included many prominent clerics who used to oppose their ideologies and provide counterarguments; district heads who collaborated with the government to identify them and security forces particularly the police who killed many of their members including their leader extra-judicially. But let me highlight some of the reasons for this.
First, as I have already stated in the first part, there was a great mishandling of the situation by the government. The government failed to understand that the problem was a social one and deserves solution from the same line. We must continue to say that the deployment of the security forces under the auspices of Operation Flush was what aggravated an already dangerous situation. Throughout the world, the government of the day seem not have known, that the moment you invite the military to address a social problem (which you are partly or in whole responsible for), they would only help to compound the situation--and they were invited and have compounded it beyond redemption.
Yes, Muhammad Yusuf was preaching a very dangerous message--and people were getting increasingly convinced--about the injustices of the government, its brutality against Islam, telling them how much the government hates the kind of their organisations, and very clearly, the government helped to confirm his messages, to convince the followers even more. The government invited soldiers who soon as they arrived began to harass people such that even those who did not believe in his messages initially began to see reason in them. Soon, we began to hear in people's conversations, such things as: 'Allah Ya yi wa malam (Muhammad Yusuf) albarka, yau yayi kaca-kaca da sojoji' - 'may God bless malam, he has condemned the soldiers flat-out today'. People who never even knew him, the victims of the soldiers' brutality, sympathisers of these victims, were hearing these things. And just too naturally, they began to flock to his preaching, believing that they would find expression of their contempt in a fearless man!
What ought to have been done then was actually to engage the leadership of the potentially dangerous organisation in an endless dialogue. Yes keep dialoguing with them. Invite them together with other scholars to the government house, talk to them. Build schools and ensure that all potential members of the group go to schools. Engage the youths in some job. Encourage other scholars to enlighten the people on the correct teaching of Islam without causing rancour and confusion.
To the best of my knowledge, none of these was done. The military crackdown on not only members of the sect as a perceived solution only helped to generate contempt for the state and eventually succeeded in breeding 'vengeful violence' in the people of the state. I have known many, to be frank, who were happy, at least at the early days, when the insurgents declared a full-scale war against the military. The point here is not to say that these people were in support or sympathetic of the insurgents, but perhaps were fed up with the excesses of the military. So it goes on to show how the soldiers compounded the matter.
You can't flog an old man in his sixties just because he crossed a red-line or ask him to frog-jump and expect his children, relations and the people around to like you in a place like Maiduguri where elders are almost revered. You would, I swear, wonder whether we were in a military regime, because it had become common to come across such scenes all over Maiduguri all the time where people are flogged or punished one way or the other for no good reason.
May the soul of HRH, Alhaji Mustapha Umar El-Kanemi, the then Shehu of Borno, rest in peace. By far, he was the only person who understood the gravity of the situation, but at the same time understood the right solution it deserved. It can be recalled that in 2006 when the insurgents defied the Shehu's order to observe the eid on a certain day and went on to perform theirs a day or two earlier, the state government mobilised security men to stop them. Perhaps it was the same Shehu whose order was defied that intervened and warned the government on the use of force. The insurgents even as early as that time were armed to teeth, battle ready, as they went out to perform their eid. It was him who had always engaged the sect leader in dialogues, admonishing him to shun violence and extremism. But sadly he died along the way and the government did not think it worthy to carry on.
The second reason was the extra-judicial killing of some of the sect members particularly their leader--as if they are innocent of that themselves! The killing of the sect leader instantly on his capture by the police was one of the things that went a long way in clearing the way for the re-emergence of the sect as an entirely terrorist group. No doubt, at the end, he has to be killed, but it has to go through the legal framework.
This factor contributed in at least two or three ways. First, it was his killing alongside some of his men extra-judicially that developed in the remaining members the feelings of vengeance. Perhaps Yusuf in a certain session of his preaching had told his followers that he knew he would be killed for saying the truth, but it was left to them, to wake up and continue the task of 'Boko-haramising' education, of establishing Sharia and so on. And he said the 'truth'--and the lies--and got killed! Perhaps whatever he said, was a gospel! And with this, is anyone surprised with Shekau's ruthlessness?
Second, it was perhaps what paved the way for Shekau who is more ruthlessly violent and aggressive to emerge as the leader of the sect. We knew that it was Shekau who almost single-handedly pressed for the 2009 war to be declared. In fact, it was said that it was him who shot Muhammad Yusuf on his arms the night before the war to push for it. He threatened him that if he did not declare the war, he would be considered an apostate himself and thus be killed too! In a piece I penned in 2011, 'We All Miss Muhammad Yusuf', I have noted that, if he was not killed instantly on his capture, chances were that one: his men would not have regrouped to take revenge. Two, if however they do (which they did), it was easier to dialogue with them, since he must have to be in detention, or ask him to instruct them, since they were quite obedient to him, to ceasefire.
Third, of course, had he been dealt with according to the law, eventually, many hidden secrets capable of bringing the crisis to an end would have been unravelled. Had he been thoroughly interrogated by security forces, professional journalists and students of knowledge, possibly this crisis would have been over now. Unfortunately, this opportunity was missed, obviously, for reasons that some truth-phobic entities wanted him and what he knew dead!
That was injustice. That was why earlier in the first part of this piece, it was noted that this crisis is fundamentally a bi-product of injustice: a reaction to injustice in stages, the first, second and third phases being results of injustice at different degrees.
Furthermore, it could be said with all confidence that those who survived the war of 2009 were quite too few to really regroup and fight back. However, what happened was that while the few, most of whom were actually the most powerful members, regrouped, they recruited new members. Our focus at this juncture is therefore, since the recruitment was almost necessary for them, how they were able to do that. This question is valid insofar as a meaningful inference is hoped to be drawn at the end because it was clear that after the war it must have clear to all and sundry that the Boko Haram madness was up to no good; and with the defeat they suffered in just three days of fight, they would not succeed even in future, to contemplate joining.
Perhaps, among such factors was the extreme poverty and idleness that our youths found themselves in. A mention has to be made that majority of the Boko Haram forces who operate now joined it after the war and did not even ever meet Muhammad Yusuf or heard his preaching up to this point in time. In 2013, I have personally interviewed over three of the insurgents when they were captured by the Civilian JTF and they all confirmed this line of argument! Of course, it could be recalled that in the first part, it was noted that even before Muhammad Yusuf armed his followers with guns, there were youths who already had with them guns and other deadly weapons.
Such youths were initially in the payrolls of politicians, as we know, particularly Ali Sheriff. But after the 2007 election, these violent thugs began to lose the patronage and support they enjoyed initially from the politicians, because their principal employer in the person of Ali Sheriff then under the defunct platform of ANPP (APP earlier) had already been re-elected for the second and last time. A note ought to be made here that these violent youths played key role in the politics of Borno then in such outrageously nonsensical crimes as carting away with ballot boxes, intimidating opposition and election agents into fear, multiple voting and etc--which were what determined the outcome of elections in the state. He was therefore growing disinterested in them as he was not running for a third term. Perhaps this can be understood from the fact that as a result of falling out with them, at the tail-end of his regime, Ali Sheriff imposed a very restrictive curfew on 'achaba' (motorcycle) as a punishment to them. They fell out because Ali Sheriff could not keep on 'furnishing' them with money as he was not after a third term. This provoked them to the extent that they swore to massively vote against him when he vied for the post of a senator in the state's metropolis. When he eventually failed to a PDP aspirant, I think we are all living witnesses to the jubilation that greeted it.
Now, by 2011, these thugs did not only fall out with their boss, he in fact relocated to Abuja, therefore 'introducing' an end to the era of ECOMOGs (violent politics). But this he did without dispossessing them of the weapons he and his likes had armed them with. And no more enjoying the patronage of the government that emerged, which not only ignored them, but derided, they became both jobless and idle. Already armed, perfected on the art of terror, uneducated, jobless and idle, how are these youths NOT ready made recruits for a Boko Haram ready to rain down money?
These youths had already specialised on the art of violence and unleashing terror, which included clandestine killings, intimidating and harassing innocent people. With no iota of Muhammad Yusuf's ideology, talk less of inspiration from Islam, but every element of materialism, these youths were recruited by the re-emerging Boko Haram, operating on the dictates of Shekau. These was even easier since the mode of operation was guerilla in nature and thus, membership remain highly secret.
Let us also add that the banning of motorcycles on the streets of Maiduguri in 2011 by the emergent governor, Kashim Shettima, deprived many of sources of livelihood, thus compounding an already compounded situation!
I think enough is said about some of the factors that brought us to where we are now. But obviously, if the first part of the piece was concentrated to the factors that brought about the first phase of the insurgency, and this the second, I think the justice has to be extended to the third phase, which we are in now, starting from mid 2013.
To be continued...
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