Understanding Some Fundamental Issues On Boko Haram
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
ETYMOLOGY AND PHASES
Abdulhamid Al-Gazali, algazali04@yahoo.com
Preface
Let me this week start my column unusually with a short preface that goes thus:
This piece, as a continuation of the lecture I delivered to Hilal Islamic Crescent on the 11th of Ramadan, 1435 A.H., is second part of the series I'm inspired by the said lecture to write in the few coming weeks. Since they are written only within the period of a week each, readers should bear with the fact that as much as I will like to, I cannot deal with the many vexing topics in that area exhaustibly. However, I hope to at the end, upgrade each and adjust them into a book for publication as part of my input to the ongoing studies/debates in that area of knowledge (Boko Haram) as a historian and someone who actually saw it from its onset for the purpose of history, security and studies. This, and the first part should therefore be treated by the reader as (a disjointed) preliminary.
BOKO HARAM: ETYMOLOGY
When I wrote last time on this subject, I did not take the time to make some very fundamental clarification on some key issues. I think for a better understanding of the crisis, I should, now.
No meaningful study of this crisis will be thorough without concentrating it even if in passing to the 'etymology' of the term 'Boko Haram' (Western education is prohibited) as it refers to the insurgents--especially at a preliminary stage. Many have treated this term as though it was the insurgents that chose to refer to themselves as so. Indeed, they were not, but certainly, whoever it was, you wonder what term could have been fitter! Their overall body language, their dispositions, the crux of their arguments, and sometimes--perhaps sometimes--their actions even at their early stages reflects the fittingness of this term to them.
Of course there couldn't have been a better name for a group of people who declared Western education a major sin and promise to stop it! There's no doubt about the fact that Muhammad Yusuf had unequivocally confirmed--to those who sought to understand whether he was only against some aspect of the Western education or the whole of it and/or confusing it with Western culture--that everything about it is 'haram' (prohibited).
So to start to rationalise this will amount to bozoism. Of course some have attempted doing that especially when he said after his capture that computers and other technologies are but not 'haram'. But this only goes to show that Yusuf did not understand what he was fighting. What is science, without technology, you tend to ask. Of course, this man had never been to any Western school to understand anything about it.
At a stage we thought he was against Western concepts, values and ideas such as feminism, democracy, liberalism, communism and so on. But to be honest with you, even though to Muslims, they are un-Islamic, Muhammed Yusuf did not understand what they stood for and/or meant, to afford him that excuse.
Or, what do you think of one who thinks Boko is all about Darwinist theory of evolution? Who thinks 'planet' is the same thing as the'world'? So, to be honest with you, this man is just a puritanical literalist with very shallow understanding of other necessary basic Islamic texts that complement the understanding of the message of the Quran. They are in Islam referred to as 'khawarij'--those who went out (of Islam), though unbeknownst to them--because of their puritan literalism and exceedingly extreme interpretation of, yes, sensitive texts. This however is common to virtually all religions. In fact, the person to whom Muhammad Yusuf can be compared is not Osama bin Laden, but John Kony of the Lord's Resistance Army, whose puritan interpretation of the Biblical text led him to believe that the world must be governed--and he will see to its implementation--by the 10 Commandments of the Bible even if thousands would die in the course.
This is a digression from the central theme of the piece, but the reason why I deem it necessary is because I want to show that though the sect members did not call themselves 'Boko Haram', their body language and utterances--ie their preaching and sermons--have already 'allocated' it to them.
Within Maiduguri, we used to refer to them as Yusufiyya: those who follow Yusuf's warped interpretation of the Quran. Though it has to be noted--again--that at the early stages of this movement, most people embraced it believing that it was the true teachings of Islam.
While we used to call them Yusufiyya, they referred to themselves as Jamma'atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad (JASLIWAJ). However, when they declared a war against the state, the term 'Boko Haram'--when it was coined by an Aljazeera reporter--became popular. That was in June 2009.
It was used even before that time to refer to them by few. The term was in fact taken from the commentaries of his followers. Those who Muhammad Yusuf had convinced, went an extra mile in some very hyper critical ways to conclude that Boko--even when Muhammad was reluctant to disclose--haram. It was common to hear from their seemingly proselytising commentaries that Boko is haram, downright; that working with the government is un-Islamic; that the government does not worth the loyalty of the people. I have known many people who, convinced to the brim, authoritatively tell people--and it was us--that Boko and working with the government is haram and they pitied them--and it was us--for not understanding that. People hearing these things a little more frequently, therefore began to ascribe the term 'Boko Haram' to them. But it is not the group's official name. 'Boko Haram' cannot be a sect's name as it means 'western education is forbidden'.
So the point here is, the fact that we have continued to call them Boko Haram has confused and misled us to believe that the group was particularly aimed at stopping or attacking western education. This is not entirely true as some of their actions and targets seem to suggest. When we come to treat #Targets of Boko Haram, this point will be adequately elaborated. But for now, this should noted.
PHASES OF THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY
Secondly, attention has to be drawn to the phases in the Boko Haram crisis as it has varying ones. As you may have already known, it used to have two phases, but three now-and went through many stages in its development. The first phase was before 2009. That was when they waged a war against the state, in a retaliation to the assault of the then security men under the aegis of Operation Flush on their men. The war was the closing of the first phase.
About a year after the war, the second phase of its development started, when the remaining few of the war forces, under Abubakar Shakau, regrouped--and drafted in new recruits--and began to unleash terror. That was when they evolved into a full-blown terrorist organisation.
The third phase is the post-Maiduguri phase. This phase started at the middle of 2013 when the Civilian JTF emerged and sent the insurgents completely out of Maiduguri. During this time, their (mode of) operations, centre of activity and targets changed. Typically, each of these three phases vary in mode of operation, severity, targets and what have you, such that, while the first phase was basically about preaching dangerous messages and posing threats, the second phase was about guerrilla warfare and the third about organised massacre and intensified kidnapping. And at the end, it can be seen that the story of Boko Haram is a story of the making of a terrorist group or perhaps the evolution of a terrorist organisation.
Now, it will be misleading to overlook or ignore these phases and/or treat them as one thing. Granted, they are three phases of one thing; but there are aspects of these phases that can best be understood only when they are treated in isolation. It is fair to say, the 2009 war marked a point of transition from the first to the second phase, and the emergence of CJTF in the middle of 2013, to the third phase; but it is even fairer to first treat the reasons for these series of transitions, before concentrating on the phases separately and drawing out their connections and dichotomies.
FACTORS THAT ACCOUNTED FOR THE TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND PHASE OF BOKO HARAM
The second phase saw the re-emergence of Boko Haram as a full-blown terrorist organisation that moved away from mere preaching to unleashing terror. Clandestine killings of selected targets, particularly those who at any time opposed them, soon claimed the lives of hundreds. These included many prominent clerics who used to oppose their ideologies and provide counterarguments; district heads who collaborated with the government to identify them and security forces particularly the police who killed many of their members including their leader extra-judicially. But let me highlight some of the reasons for this.
First, as I have already stated in the first part, there was a great mishandling of the situation by the government. The government failed to understand that the problem was a social one and deserves solution from the same line. We must continue to say that the deployment of the security forces under the auspices of Operation Flush was what aggravated an already dangerous situation. Throughout the world, the government of the day seem not have known, that the moment you invite the military to address a social problem (which you are partly or in whole responsible for), they would only help to compound the situation--and they were invited and have compounded it beyond redemption.
Yes, Muhammad Yusuf was preaching a very dangerous message--and people were getting increasingly convinced--about the injustices of the government, its brutality against Islam, telling them how much the government hates the kind of their organisations, and very clearly, the government helped to confirm his messages, to convince the followers even more. The government invited soldiers who soon as they arrived began to harass people such that even those who did not believe in his messages initially began to see reason in them. Soon, we began to hear in people's conversations, such things as: 'Allah Ya yi wa malam (Muhammad Yusuf) albarka, yau yayi kaca-kaca da sojoji' - 'may God bless malam, he has condemned the soldiers flat-out today'. People who never even knew him, the victims of the soldiers' brutality, sympathisers of these victims, were hearing these things. And just too naturally, they began to flock to his preaching, believing that they would find expression of their contempt in a fearless man!
What ought to have been done then was actually to engage the leadership of the potentially dangerous organisation in an endless dialogue. Yes keep dialoguing with them. Invite them together with other scholars to the government house, talk to them. Build schools and ensure that all potential members of the group go to schools. Engage the youths in some job. Encourage other scholars to enlighten the people on the correct teaching of Islam without causing rancour and confusion.
To the best of my knowledge, none of these was done. The military crackdown on not only members of the sect as a perceived solution only helped to generate contempt for the state and eventually succeeded in breeding 'vengeful violence' in the people of the state. I have known many, to be frank, who were happy, at least at the early days, when the insurgents declared a full-scale war against the military. The point here is not to say that these people were in support or sympathetic of the insurgents, but perhaps were fed up with the excesses of the military. So it goes on to show how the soldiers compounded the matter.
You can't flog an old man in his sixties just because he crossed a red-line or ask him to frog-jump and expect his children, relations and the people around to like you in a place like Maiduguri where elders are almost revered. You would, I swear, wonder whether we were in a military regime, because it had become common to come across such scenes all over Maiduguri all the time where people are flogged or punished one way or the other for no good reason.
May the soul of HRH, Alhaji Mustapha Umar El-Kanemi, the then Shehu of Borno, rest in peace. By far, he was the only person who understood the gravity of the situation, but at the same time understood the right solution it deserved. It can be recalled that in 2006 when the insurgents defied the Shehu's order to observe the eid on a certain day and went on to perform theirs a day or two earlier, the state government mobilised security men to stop them. Perhaps it was the same Shehu whose order was defied that intervened and warned the government on the use of force. The insurgents even as early as that time were armed to teeth, battle ready, as they went out to perform their eid. It was him who had always engaged the sect leader in dialogues, admonishing him to shun violence and extremism. But sadly he died along the way and the government did not think it worthy to carry on.
The second reason was the extra-judicial killing of some of the sect members particularly their leader--as if they are innocent of that themselves! The killing of the sect leader instantly on his capture by the police was one of the things that went a long way in clearing the way for the re-emergence of the sect as an entirely terrorist group. No doubt, at the end, he has to be killed, but it has to go through the legal framework.
This factor contributed in at least two or three ways. First, it was his killing alongside some of his men extra-judicially that developed in the remaining members the feelings of vengeance. Perhaps Yusuf in a certain session of his preaching had told his followers that he knew he would be killed for saying the truth, but it was left to them, to wake up and continue the task of 'Boko-haramising' education, of establishing Sharia and so on. And he said the 'truth'--and the lies--and got killed! Perhaps whatever he said, was a gospel! And with this, is anyone surprised with Shekau's ruthlessness?
Second, it was perhaps what paved the way for Shekau who is more ruthlessly violent and aggressive to emerge as the leader of the sect. We knew that it was Shekau who almost single-handedly pressed for the 2009 war to be declared. In fact, it was said that it was him who shot Muhammad Yusuf on his arms the night before the war to push for it. He threatened him that if he did not declare the war, he would be considered an apostate himself and thus be killed too! In a piece I penned in 2011, 'We All Miss Muhammad Yusuf', I have noted that, if he was not killed instantly on his capture, chances were that one: his men would not have regrouped to take revenge. Two, if however they do (which they did), it was easier to dialogue with them, since he must have to be in detention, or ask him to instruct them, since they were quite obedient to him, to ceasefire.
Third, of course, had he been dealt with according to the law, eventually, many hidden secrets capable of bringing the crisis to an end would have been unravelled. Had he been thoroughly interrogated by security forces, professional journalists and students of knowledge, possibly this crisis would have been over now. Unfortunately, this opportunity was missed, obviously, for reasons that some truth-phobic entities wanted him and what he knew dead!
That was injustice. That was why earlier in the first part of this piece, it was noted that this crisis is fundamentally a bi-product of injustice: a reaction to injustice in stages, the first, second and third phases being results of injustice at different degrees.
Furthermore, it could be said with all confidence that those who survived the war of 2009 were quite too few to really regroup and fight back. However, what happened was that while the few, most of whom were actually the most powerful members, regrouped, they recruited new members. Our focus at this juncture is therefore, since the recruitment was almost necessary for them, how they were able to do that. This question is valid insofar as a meaningful inference is hoped to be drawn at the end because it was clear that after the war it must have clear to all and sundry that the Boko Haram madness was up to no good; and with the defeat they suffered in just three days of fight, they would not succeed even in future, to contemplate joining.
Perhaps, among such factors was the extreme poverty and idleness that our youths found themselves in. A mention has to be made that majority of the Boko Haram forces who operate now joined it after the war and did not even ever meet Muhammad Yusuf or heard his preaching up to this point in time. In 2013, I have personally interviewed over three of the insurgents when they were captured by the Civilian JTF and they all confirmed this line of argument! Of course, it could be recalled that in the first part, it was noted that even before Muhammad Yusuf armed his followers with guns, there were youths who already had with them guns and other deadly weapons.
Such youths were initially in the payrolls of politicians, as we know, particularly Ali Sheriff. But after the 2007 election, these violent thugs began to lose the patronage and support they enjoyed initially from the politicians, because their principal employer in the person of Ali Sheriff then under the defunct platform of ANPP (APP earlier) had already been re-elected for the second and last time. A note ought to be made here that these violent youths played key role in the politics of Borno then in such outrageously nonsensical crimes as carting away with ballot boxes, intimidating opposition and election agents into fear, multiple voting and etc--which were what determined the outcome of elections in the state. He was therefore growing disinterested in them as he was not running for a third term. Perhaps this can be understood from the fact that as a result of falling out with them, at the tail-end of his regime, Ali Sheriff imposed a very restrictive curfew on 'achaba' (motorcycle) as a punishment to them. They fell out because Ali Sheriff could not keep on 'furnishing' them with money as he was not after a third term. This provoked them to the extent that they swore to massively vote against him when he vied for the post of a senator in the state's metropolis. When he eventually failed to a PDP aspirant, I think we are all living witnesses to the jubilation that greeted it.
Now, by 2011, these thugs did not only fall out with their boss, he in fact relocated to Abuja, therefore 'introducing' an end to the era of ECOMOGs (violent politics). But this he did without dispossessing them of the weapons he and his likes had armed them with. And no more enjoying the patronage of the government that emerged, which not only ignored them, but derided, they became both jobless and idle. Already armed, perfected on the art of terror, uneducated, jobless and idle, how are these youths NOT ready made recruits for a Boko Haram ready to rain down money?
These youths had already specialised on the art of violence and unleashing terror, which included clandestine killings, intimidating and harassing innocent people. With no iota of Muhammad Yusuf's ideology, talk less of inspiration from Islam, but every element of materialism, these youths were recruited by the re-emerging Boko Haram, operating on the dictates of Shekau. These was even easier since the mode of operation was guerilla in nature and thus, membership remain highly secret.
Let us also add that the banning of motorcycles on the streets of Maiduguri in 2011 by the emergent governor, Kashim Shettima, deprived many of sources of livelihood, thus compounding an already compounded situation!
I think enough is said about some of the factors that brought us to where we are now. But obviously, if the first part of the piece was concentrated to the factors that brought about the first phase of the insurgency, and this the second, I think the justice has to be extended to the third phase, which we are in now, starting from mid 2013.
To be continued...
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